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The hippocampus is thought to be an associative memory “convergence zone,” binding together the
multimodal elements of an experienced event into a single engram. This predicts a degree of dependency
between the retrieval of the different elements comprising an event. We present data from a series of
studies designed to address this prediction. Participants vividly imagined a series of person–location–
object events, and memory for these events was assessed across multiple trials of cued retrieval.
Consistent with the prediction, a significant level of dependency was found between the retrieval of
different elements from the same event. Furthermore, the level of dependency was sensitive both to
retrieval task, with higher dependency during cued recall than cued recognition, and to subjective
confidence. We propose a simple model, in which events are stored as multiple pairwise associations
between individual event elements, and dependency is captured by a common factor that varies across
events. This factor may relate to between-events modulation of the strength of encoding, or to a process
of within-event “pattern completion” at retrieval. The model predicts the quantitative pattern of depen-
dency in the data when changes in the level of guessing with retrieval task and confidence are taken into
account. Thus, we find direct behavioral support for the idea that memory for complex multimodal events
depends on the pairwise associations of their constituent elements and that retrieval of the various
elements corresponding to the same event reflects a common factor that varies from event to event.
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Episodic memories are composed of multiple elements, from the
people we meet, to the objects we interact with, to the locations we
navigate through. Despite this multimodal information being rep-
resented in separate neocortical regions, we are seemingly able to
retrieve distinct memories that reflect the rich multimodal nature
of the original event. The hippocampus, a region critical to epi-
sodic memory (Cohen & Eichenbaum, 1993; Kinsbourne & Wood,
1975; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Scoville & Milner, 1957; Squire &
Zola-Morgan, 1991), is thought to underlie this ability—acting as
a “convergence zone” to bind multimodal information into a single
engram (Damasio, 1989; Marr, 1971; McClelland, McNaughton,
& O’Reilly, 1995; Teyler & DiScenna, 1986). This proposal fits
with the idea that episodic memory is supported by the existence
of event engrams, discrete bound representations containing infor-
mation about multiple event elements (Tulving, 1983).
Despite this hypothesis from both neuroscientific and psycho-
logical theories of episodic memory, little evidence has been
presented relating to the associative structure of the representation
of multi-element events. If event engrams correspond to the asso-
ciation of multiple elements (e.g., locations, people and objects) to
form a single representation, there should be some degree of
dependency between the retrieval of elements from the same event
compared with the retrieval of elements from different events.
Thus, the probability of successfully retrieving one element from
an event should be related to the probability of successfully re-
trieving another element from the same event. Alternatively, pair-
wise associations between different within-event elements could
be encoded and retrieved independently, predicting no relationship
between the retrieval of two different elements from the same
event. To date, research into episodic memory has focused on
memory either for lists of single items or for associations between
pairs of items or between items and their “source” or “context.”
Although the hippocampus has been implicated in supporting these
associations, and specifically cross-modal associations (e.g.,
Eichenbaum, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Hannula, Tranel, &
Cohen, 2006; Mayes, Montaldi, & Migo, 2007; Vargha-Khadem et
al., 1997), previous studies did not address the issue of dependency
across multiple elements within the same event.
To test the hypothesis that cued retrievals of the elements
comprising a single event are related, events with more than two
elements need to be tested. In the present study, we required
participants to learn location–person–object triplets. Using three
elements, we can ask how dependent the retrieval of one element
(e.g., the person) is on retrieval of another element (e.g., the
object) when cued by the third element (e.g., the location). Previ-
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ous research has focused on the sequential pairwise associative
relationships among three distinct elements. For example, by ask-
ing how the existence of a pre-existing association (e.g., A–to–B)
affects the encoding of a new overlapping association (e.g.,
A–to–C; Martin, 1971), how the retrieval of noncued associated
elements (e.g., A–to–B) when learning a new association (e.g.,
A–to–C) promotes the encoding of multi-element bindings (e.g.,
encoding of B–to–C; Zeithamova, Dominick, & Preston, 2012) or
how the repeated retrieval of a learned association (e.g., A–to–B)
decreases the probability of retrieving other previously associated
elements (e.g., A–to–C; retrieval-induced forgetting, or RIF; An-
derson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). Given our focus on episodic event
memory, however, we focused on the relationship among three
elements when encoded simultaneously, a situation more akin to
the encoding of episodic events in the real world.
Jones (1976) tested memory for more than two elements, re-
quiring participants to learn object–color–location events shown
as a two-dimensional photograph. At test, participants were cued
with either one or two elements and were required to recall the
remaining element(s). Although performance improved when two
cues were presented relative to one, the improvement was less than
expected if the two cues were independently associated with the
tested element. Jones proposed a fragmentation hypothesis where
mnemonic representations could contain any or all elements within
an event. The proposal of an engram that contains all elements of
an event accords with Tulving’s (1983) idea of a single bound
event. These studies however did not assess the dependency of
retrieving elements within an event. Stronger evidence in favor of
a bound event would entail showing that on an event-by-event
basis, the probability of retrieving one element was contingent on
the probability of retrieving another.
Within the source memory literature, episodic dependence has
been assessed by associating single items (e.g., a word) with two
“sources” (e.g., location and font type). For example, Meiser and
Bröder (2002) provided evidence for a degree of dependence in
retrieving both source elements when presented with the item,
particularly in situations associated with the phenomenological
experience of recollection (Gardiner, 1988). More recently, how-
ever, it has been suggested that source details are principally
associated with the item and not with each other (Starns & Hicks,
2005, 2008), suggesting a degree of asymmetry in relation to
object–color–location representations whereby color source infor-
mation and location source information are independently bound
to object information but not to each other (also see the idea of
headed records; Morton, Hammersley, & Bekerian, 1985). Such
source memory experiments combine a single item with multiple
sources, giving a primacy to a single element within an event.
Furthermore, using object features as source details (e.g., color)
may not require the multimodal binding mechanisms the hip-
pocampus is thought to perform. We were interested in examining
dependency among distinct event elements that are likely individ-
ually represented within different neocortical regions. Further-
more, each element was an individual “item” in the sense that no
element was a subordinate feature of another element (e.g., the
color of an object).
We previously showed that cued retrieval of the elements of
events experienced in a virtual reality computer game, composed
of an object, a place, and either a person or an odor, was impaired
by hippocampal damage (Spiers, Burgess, Hartley, Vargha-
Khadem, & O’Keefe, 2001; Spiers, Burgess, Maguire, et al., 2001;
see also Burgess, Maguire, & O’Keefe, 2002). In a speculative
analysis of these data (Trinkler, King, Spiers, & Burgess, 2006),
we failed to find any significant dependence between the cued
retrieval of different elements of the same event. However the
small numbers of events, low performance levels in the paired
forced-choice memory tests, and unsophisticated analyses severely
reduced the power of this analysis, making the result ambiguous.
In the present experiments, in order to engage the hippocampal
system thought to underlie episodic binding, we presented partic-
ipants with three distinct event elements (as words)—a location,
famous person, and common object (e.g., a supermarket, Barack
Obama, and a pencil case; see also Yim, Dennis, & Sloutsky,
2011). They were instructed to construct a scene involving all three
elements and imagine themselves “as vividly as possible” within
the constructed scene. For example, they might imagine Barack
Obama at a supermarket checkout buying a pencil case. This scene
construction encoding task was again designed to engage the
hippocampus (see Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Byrne, Becker,
& Burgess, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis,
Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007) to a greater extent than previ-
ous multi-element source memory studies. Finally, as we were
principally interested in the encoding of bound events, we tested
memory for these events across multiple retrieval trials by cuing
with a single element and testing either one (Experiments 2–3) or
both (Experiment 1) uncued elements. Thus, we could examine
how the probability of retrieving one element depended on the
probability of retrieving another element of the same event.
Using this experimental paradigm, we assessed episodic depen-
dency across three experiments. First, we created contingency
tables based on performance for two elements from the same event
when cued by the remaining element (as well as performance for
a single element when cued by the two remaining elements across
retrieval trials). For instance, we constructed a 2  2 contingency
table based on the probability of retrieving the person and object
when cued by location. The existence of discrete event engrams
would predict a degree of dependency such that most retrieval
trials should either successfully or unsuccessfully retrieve both the
person and object. In other words, retrieving the person but not the
object (and vice versa) should be rare. To appropriately assess
dependency, controlling for overall memory performance, we cre-
ated an independent model that assumes independent pairwise
associations are formed among the elements composing an event
and that cued retrieval of one element by another element reflects
the strength of the corresponding association. The independent
model served as a baseline (i.e., the null hypothesis) against which
we compared the degree of dependency in the data across three
experiments. These experiments provide strong evidence for epi-
sodic dependency, and therefore, we built further models designed
to account for such evidence. First, in Experiment 1, using a
cued-recall task at retrieval we provide strong evidence against the
independent model.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Fourteen participants (five men) gave informed
consent to participate in Experiment 1. One participant was ex-
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cluded from further analyses due to 100% cued-recall perfor-
mance. The remaining 13 participants had a mean age of 24.2
years (SD  3.9). By self-report, all participants were right-
handed. All experiments were approved by the University College
London Research Ethics Committee (NB/PWB/26102011a).
Materials. Stimuli were 24 locations (e.g., a swimming pool),
famous personalities (e.g., David Cameron), and common objects
(e.g., a bicycle; see the Appendix for a full list of stimuli). Four
randomized sets of events (i.e., location–person–object triplets) were
created. For each of the four sets, a pseudo-randomized test order was
generated (details provided later). These four sets were rotated across
participants to reduce possible stimulus or test-order effects.
Procedure. The experiment consisted of a single study and
test phase. At study, participants were serially presented with all
24 events, each consisting of a location, a famous person, and an
object. All three items within an event were presented on a
computer screen as words. The location was always presented in
the middle of the screen just above fixation, with the person
appearing toward the bottom left and the object toward the bottom
right. The items remained onscreen for 12 s. During this time,
participants were required to imagine an event that contained all
three items. They were told to be “as imaginative as possible” in
combining the three items and imagine the event “as vividly as
possible.” Each event was preceded by a 3-s fixation cross. The
order of event presentation was randomized across participants.
At test, participants performed a cued-recall task. Each trial
consisted of a single item from an event (e.g., a location), and
participants were required to recall the other two items from the
same event (e.g., the person and object). They were also required
to give a confidence rating ranging from 1 (low confidence) to 5
(high confidence) for each of the recalled items. Participants were
instructed to give a low confidence if they thought they might have
retrieved the correct item; however, they were told to report “don’t
know” instead of guessing (confidence was not recorded for these
trials). Participants verbally reported the recalled items and confi-
dence ratings. The experimenter recorded the accuracy and confi-
dence for each trial on a preprinted answer sheet that contained the
correct answers. A cued-recall answer was only deemed correct if
the exact name used at encoding was used (i.e., phonetically or
semantically similar answers were marked as incorrect). The ex-
perimenter was silent during this period until an answer was given.
If the participant failed to report an answer within 30 s of the cue
being presented, the experimenter marked the trial as incorrect,
and the next cue was presented.
Recall of each event was separately cued using each of the three
items (location, person, and object), making a total of 72 cued-
recall trials. All 24 events were tested across three blocks. In each
block, eight events were cued by location, eight by person, and
eight by object. The two subsequent blocks cued each event using
the remaining noncued items (e.g., if cued by location in the first
block, the second block may have been cued by person and the
third by object). Within this structure, four pseudo-randomized test
sequences were created and rotated across participants. For each
test sequence, the order of cue type across blocks for each event
and the order of testing each event within each block were ran-
domized. Prior to the main experiment, participants were given a
single event, with three items not used in the main experiment, to
practice both the encoding task and the cued-recall task.
The independent model. In order to assess the dependency of
memory performance for items within individual events, we created
an independent model of cued-recall performance (and cued-
recognition performance; see Experiments 2 and 3). The contingency
table for the independent model is presented in Table 1. The contin-
gency table shows how the probability of successfully or unsuccess-
fully retrieving a single item within an event depends on the proba-
bility of retrieving the other item. Each event (i 1 to N) is composed
of three items, A (location), B (person), and C (object). For any given
participant, the proportion of correct retrievals of B (over N events)
when cued by A is denoted by PAB (i.e., the mean performance across
all events for B when cued by A). For the independent model, when
cued by A, the probability of (a) correctly retrieving both B and C (for
all events) is equal to PABPAC; (b) correctly retrieving B but not C is
equal to PAB(1  PAC); (c) correctly retrieving C but not B is equal
to (1  PAB)PAC; and (d) incorrectly retrieving B and C is equal to
(1  PAB)(1  PAC).
Table 1
Contingency Table for the Independent Model, Dependent Model, and Dependent Model With Guessing, for Successful Retrieval of
Elements B and C When Cued With Element A
Retrieval of Element B
Retrieval of
Element C Correct (PAB) Incorrect (1  PAB)
Independent model
Correct (PAC) PABPAC PAC(1  PAB)
Incorrect (1  PAC) PAB (1  PAC) (1  PAB)(1  PAC)
Dependent model
Correct (PAC) PABPAC 1N(Ei)2 PAC 1N Ei(1  EiPAB)
Incorrect (1  PAC) PAB 1N Ei(1  EiPAC) 1N (1  EiPAB)(1  EiPAC)
Dependent model with
guessing
Correct (PAC) 1N[Ei(PAB  PG /c)  PG /c][Ei(PAC  PG /c)  PG /c] 1N[1  {Ei(PAB  PG/c)  PG /c}][Ei(PAC  PG/c)  PG/c]
Incorrect (1  PAC) 1N[Ei(PAB  PG /c)  PG /c]
[1  {Ei(PAC  PG /c)  PG /c}]
1N[1  {Ei(PAB  PG/c)  PG /c}]
[1  {Ei(PAC  PG/c)  PG /c}]
Note. Dependent model equates to the independent model if Ei (episodic factor)  1. Dependent model with guessing equates to the dependent model
if PG (probability when guessing)  0 and equates to the independent model if Ei  1. The table gives the proportion of responses falling into the four
categories.
1372 HORNER AND BURGESS
Contingency tables for the observed data and the independent
model were created for each individual participant for each cue type
to assess the dependency between the retrieval of two items (e.g.,
person and object) using the same cue type (e.g., location) within a
single cued-recall trial (the ABAC analysis). We also assessed the
degree of dependency for retrieving an individual item (e.g., location)
when cued using different items (e.g., person vs. object), across two
cued-recall trials (the BACA analysis; see also Trinkler et al., 2006).
Thus, six contingency tables were created for each participant for the
observed data and the independent model. For the observed data, each
cell within a 2  2 contingency table contains the number of events
whose retrieval resulted in the outcome corresponding to that cell
(e.g., both B and C retrieved correctly when cued by A for the top-left
cell in the ABAC analysis). For the independent model, each cell
contains the number expected from an independent combination of
the overall performance levels for each pairwise association (e.g.,
PABPACN).
Dependency measure. To relate the data to the independent
model, we calculated a measure of dependency (D) by summing
the leading diagonal cells for each 2  2 contingency table and
dividing this by the overall number of events (known as accuracy
within binary classification tests). This measure therefore reflects
the proportion of trials in which both items comprising an event
were either successfully or unsuccessfully retrieved, where 1 
full dependence and 0.5  full independence (a score of  0.5
reflects dependency in the opposite direction such that successful
retrieval of one item is less likely, given successful retrieval of
another item within the same event).
Using this dependency measure, we first performed 2  3
(analysis type [ABAC vs. BACA]  item type [location vs. person
vs. object]) analyses of variance (ANOVAs), comparing depen-
dency for the data across analysis type and item type. Note that the
item type (location, person, or object) for the ABAC analysis
relates to the cue type, whereas for the BACA analysis, it relates to
the retrieval type. Given that we saw no consistent differences in
dependency across these factors across experiments (see Results),
we averaged across them and compared dependency in the data to
the independent model. Note that the raw dependency measure is
dependent on overall performance—the higher the performance,
the greater the dependency in the data and the independent mod-
el—therefore, comparisons between the data and the independent
model are used to assess this raw measure. Indeed, the independent
model is explicitly designed to assess dependency without the
confounding presence of accuracy (see Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, &
Oliva, 2012, for discussion of this issue).
Results
Cued-recall performance. Performance was well above
chance (which would be 4%, given the 24 possible responses to
each cued-recall trial) with performance at 57% across cue type
and retrieval type (see Table 2). Performance across cue type and
retrieval type appeared well matched, ranging from 55% to 61%.
A one-way within-subject ANOVA across retrieval type (col-
lapsed across cue type) revealed a trend for a main effect, F(1.7,
20.0)  3.11, p  .08, p2  .21, with poorer performance for
people than for objects, t(12) 3.24, p .01, d 0.52, remaining
contrasts: t(12)s  1.2, ps  .28. A similar ANOVA across cue
type (collapsed across retrieval type) failed to reveal a main effect,
F(1.8, 22.0)  .46, p  .62, p2  .04. Cued-recall performance
was therefore poorer for people than for objects; however, there
was little evidence for differences across cue type. Finally, a
one-way ANOVA revealed that cued-recall performance differed
across subjective confidence, F(1.8, 11.1) 16.96, p .001, p2
.74, with an increase in performance from lowest confidence
(15.8% accuracy) to highest confidence (95.9% accuracy).
Dependency analysis. The mean proportion of trials in which
both elements were either successfully or unsuccessfully retrieved
across participants (i.e., the dependency measure) for each ABAC
and BACA analysis and each item type for the observed data are
shown in Table 3. We first performed a 2  3 (analysis type
[ABAC vs. BACA]  item type [location vs. person vs. object])
ANOVA to ensure the dependency measure was consistent across
these factors. Unexpectedly, we saw a significant main effect of
analysis type, F(1, 12)  6.96, p  .05, p2  .37, with greater
dependency in the ABAC than BACA analysis. This effect may
have been due to the ABAC analysis assessing dependency within
retrieval trials, whereas the BACA analysis assessed dependency
across retrieval trials. We also saw a main effect of item type,
F(1.9, 22.5)  3.83, p  .05, p2  .24, but no significant
interaction, F(1.8, 22.1)  0.33, p  .70, p2  .03. Given this
latter main effect was not seen consistently across Experiments
1–3, it is not discussed further. We subsequently averaged across
these conditions for the data and the independent model prior to
model comparison.
Dependency (D) for the data and independent model is shown in
Figure 1. Comparing the data to the independent model, we found
significantly greater dependence than the independent model,
Table 2
Percentage of Correct Cued Recall (for Experiment 1), Cued
Recognition (for Experiments 2–3), and Low/High Confidence
Across Events (for Experiment 3) for Each Retrieval and
Cue Type
Retrieval type
Cue type Location Person Object
Experiment 1
Location n/a 55.8 (29.4) 57.7 (25.8)
Person 56.1 (30.2) n/a 61.2 (27.4)
Object 59.0 (27.4) 55.1 (29.8) n/a
Experiment 2
Location n/a 59.8 (28.8) 54.6 (27.3)
Person 58.7 (25.4) n/a 59.1 (22.8)
Object 55.6 (28.0) 61.5 (25.4) n/a
Experiment 3
Location n/a 70.2 (25.1) 68.7 (27.9)
Person 71.0 (28.3) n/a 72.7 (24.7)
Object 71.1 (25.3) 73.7 (21.4) n/a
Low confidence
Location n/a 59.9 (27.4) 59.2 (29.4)
Person 61.4 (32.5) n/a 64.0 (28.0)
Object 63.8 (26.7) 66.2 (23.3) n/a
High confidence
Location n/a 80.4 (24.7) 78.3 (29.0)
Person 80.7 (26.8) n/a 81.4 (23.6)
Object 78.5 (27.2) 81.2 (22.2) n/a
Note. Retrieval type refers to the element the participants were tested on,
and cue type refers to the element the participants were cued with. Standard
deviations appear in parentheses. n/a  not applicable.
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t(12)  8.58, p  .001, d  2.39. Thus, by rejecting the indepen-
dent model, we provide evidence for within-event dependency.
One possible issue with our design is that it requires the partic-
ipant to engage in multiple retrieval trials. This procedure may
artificially inflate the level of dependency. For example, retrieving
elements B and C when cued by A may increase the associative
strength between B and C, resulting in more consistent accuracy
for all within-event elements in later retrieval trials. To address this
possibility, we calculated dependency for the first retrieval trial of
each event (as well as the second and third retrieval trial). We also
calculated dependency for the independent model based on these
individual trials to control for possible differences in accuracy
across retrieval trials. Accuracy increased across retrieval trials
(Trials 1–3: 51.9%, 58.2%, 62.3%), F(1.9, 22.7) 9.53, p .001,
p2  .44. Despite this increase, no difference in dependency was
seen across retrieval trials (Trials 1–3: 0.89, 0.86, 0.87), F(1.5,
17.6)  0.98, p  .37, p2  .08. Indeed, when accounting for
accuracy increases by subtracting dependency for the independent
model from dependency for the data (data  independent model),
a decrease in dependency was seen (Trials 1–3: 0.27, 0.21, 0.17),
F(1.6, 19.9) 6.39, p .05, p2 .35. We could therefore find no
evidence that testing events across multiple retrieval trials in-
creased dependency. Instead, we saw decreases in dependency
despite increased accuracy across retrieval trials.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 assessed dependency within three-element events
using a cued-recall task. The observed dependency was greater
than the Independent Model, providing evidence for episodic de-
pendence. This result is in contrast to Trinkler et al. (2006) who,
using a virtual reality encoding environment, failed to show any
dependence for similar location-person-object triplets. One key
difference between the studies is the use of a cued-recognition
judgment in Trinkler et al. (2006) compared with the use of a
cued-recall task here. In Experiment 2 therefore, we used a six-
alternative forced-choice cued-recognition judgment. On a given
retrieval trial, a single cue was presented (as in Experiment 1), and
only one of the other elements was assessed (e.g., if cued by
location, the person or the object was assessed). Six items (e.g.,
people) were presented on the screen beneath the cue (e.g., loca-
tion) at the same time. Five of these items were associated with
other learned events, and one item was associated with the cue
item. The encoding conditions were identical to Experiment 1.
Method
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 with the following
exceptions:
Table 3
Mean Dependency (and Standard Deviation) for the ABAC and BACA Analyses for the Observed Data for Experiments 1–3 and
Low/High Confidence Across Events for Experiment 3
ABAC analysis BACA analysis
Experiment
Location cue—
Person/
object retrieval
Person cue—
Location/
object retrieval
Object cue—
Location/
person retrieval
Object/person
cue—Location
retrieval
Location/object
cue—Person
retrieval
Location/person
cue—Object
retrieval
Experiment 1 0.89 (0.07) 0.89 (0.07) 0.84 (0.08) 0.83 (0.10) 0.86 (0.06) 0.80 (0.11)
Experiment 2 0.69 (0.09) 0.71 (0.10) 0.70 (0.10) 0.68 (0.12) 0.69 (0.10) 0.65 (0.10)
Experiment 3 0.77 (0.14) 0.76 (0.16) 0.73 (0.15) 0.75 (0.14) 0.70 (0.15) 0.72 (0.17)
Low confidence 0.73 (0.14) 0.69 (0.18) 0.65 (0.18) 0.68 (0.16) 0.60 (0.18) 0.64 (0.18)
High confidence 0.81 (0.16) 0.83 (0.17) 0.82 (0.14) 0.82 (0.16) 0.80 (0.17) 0.80 (0.21)
Figure 1. Mean dependency (D) for the observed data and independent model, collapsed across the ABAC and
BACA analyses and item type, for (A) Experiments 1–3 and (B) low and high confidence events for Experiment
3. Error bars represent 	1 standard error. Exp.  experiment; ns  nonsignificant.  p  .05.  p  .01.
 p  .001.
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Participants. Fifteen participants (11 men) gave informed
consent to participate in Experiment 2. The mean age across
participants was 24.3 years (SD  5.0). By self-report, two par-
ticipants were left-handed, and the remainder right-handed.
Materials. In order to equate overall performance across ex-
periments, we increased the total number of episodes from 24 to
36. Stimuli were therefore 36 locations (e.g., a swimming pool),
famous personalities (e.g., David Cameron), and common objects
(e.g., a bicycle; see the Appendix).
Procedure. Use of 36 events created a total of 216 cued-
recognition trials. All 36 events were tested across six blocks.
Every event was tested with one of the cue-test pairs (e.g., cue:
location, test: object) in each block, and for each block, each of the
six cue-test pairs was used six times. Four test sequences were
created and rotated across participants. For each test sequence, the
order of cue-test pairs across blocks for each episode and the order
of testing each event within each block were randomized.
On a given test trial, the cue and the six-alternative test items
were presented simultaneously. The cue was presented in the
middle of the screen with the six test items in two rows of three at
the bottom of the screen. Participants were instructed to select the
test item that was originally paired with the cue (e.g., which person
was in the same event as this location?). They were required to
respond within 5 s with a key press, and following this action were
given a further 5 s to rate their confidence on a scale of 1–5.
Participants were instructed to answer as accurately as possible
within the time given.
Results
Cued-recognition performance. Performance was well
above chance (which would be 16.7% given the six-alternative
forced-choice decision) with performance at 58% across cue type
and retrieval type (see Table 2). Performance across the cue type
and retrieval type appeared well matched, ranging from 56% to
61%. A one-way within-subject ANOVA across retrieval type
(collapsed across cue type) revealed a significant effect, F(1.8,
25.3)  3.51, p  .05, p2  .20, with greater accuracy when
retrieving people, followed by locations and objects (note this is
the opposite pattern to the trend seen in Experiment 1). No effect
of cue type was seen, F(1.9, 26.3) .46, p .63, p2 .03. Across
Experiments 1–2, we could therefore find no consistent differences
in performance across locations, people, and objects. Finally, a
one-way ANOVA revealed that cued-recognition performance dif-
fered across subjective confidence, F(2.6, 35.9) 23.22, p .001,
p2  .62, with an increase in performance from lowest confidence
(11.5% accuracy) to highest confidence (84.8% accuracy).
Dependency analysis. The mean proportion of trials in which
both elements from an event were either successfully or unsuc-
cessfully retrieved across participants (D) for each ABAC and
BACA analysis and each item type for the observed data are shown
in Table 3. Note that in Experiment 1, the ABAC analysis was a
measure of within-trial dependency, as participants were required
to retrieve both noncued items. In Experiment 2, the ABAC anal-
ysis is a measure of between-trial dependency as a single retrieval
trial tests only one of the noncued items.
A 2  3 (Analysis Type  Item Type) ANOVA on dependency
of the observed data revealed a trend for a main effect of analysis
type, F(1, 14)  3.42, p  .09, p2  .20. The remaining main
effect and interaction term did not approach significance, Fs .80,
ps  .44, p2s  .06. We could therefore find no consistent
differences in dependency across analysis type and item type.
Dependency (D) for the data and independent model is shown in
Figure 1. The data showed greater dependency than the indepen-
dent model, t(14)  3.50, p  .01, d  0.91, in line with
Experiment 1. Despite no difference in accuracy between Exper-
iments 1 and 2, t(26)  0.08, p  .94, d  0.03, we found
significantly less dependency in Experiment 2 than in Experiment
1, t(26)  6.69, p  .001, d  2.61. Note that we can make this
direct comparison (i.e., without reference to the independent
model) because accuracy was equated between Experiments 1 and
2. Thus, performance in the cued-recognition task showed greater
dependence than the independent model, but less dependence than
Experiment 1.
As in Experiment 1, we next investigated whether dependency
changed across retrieval trials. As a single element was tested on
each retrieval trial, we calculated dependency by pairing retrieval
Trials 1–2, 3–4, and 5–6. As in Experiment 1, accuracy increased
across retrieval trials (Pairs 1–3: 52.5%, 58.9%, 63.3%), F(1.6,
22.2) 8.95, p .01, p2 .39. Dependency also increased across
retrieval trials (Pairs 1–3: 0.65, 0.74, 0.74), F(1.8, 25.3)  5.49,
p  .05, p2  .28. This increase in dependency was principally
driven by the increase in accuracy however. Analysis of the
difference between the data and the independent model (Trials
1–3: 0.06, 0.10, 0.04) revealed a significant effect, F(1.7, 23.3) 
4.29, p  .05, p2  .23, that was driven by a decrease in the
difference between the independent model and the data between
the second and third retrieval pair. Replicating Experiment 1, we
therefore saw an increase in accuracy across retrieval trials but a
decrease in dependency (once we accounted for increased accu-
racy).
In summary, Experiments 1 and 2 showed dependence greater
than the independent model. Dependence however varied as a
function of retrieval task, with greater dependence when memory
was tested with a cued-recall (Experiment 1) than with a cued-
recognition (Experiment 2) task. Finally, we could find no evi-
dence in favor of increased levels of dependence across retrieval
trials, suggesting our evidence for episodic dependency was not
driven by repeated retrieval of events. Indeed, dependency de-
creased across retrieval trials in Experiments 1 and 2 despite
increases in overall accuracy.
Experiment 3
Given the finding that episodic dependency in Experiment 2 was
significantly reduced relative to Experiment 1 by a change in
retrieval task, we sought to both replicate and extend the findings
of Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 3, we explored the differ-
ence between the cued recall used in Experiment 1 and the cued
recognition used in Experiment 2 by having participants perform
covert recall prior to performing cued recognition. Specifically, we
were interested in seeing whether within-subject (inter-event) dif-
ferences in dependency would reflect the subjective confidence of
covert recall prior to the cued-recognition judgment.
Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2 except, at retrieval,
participants were presented with the cue for 3 s and asked to
“retrieve the entire episode.” They were then asked to judge how
confident they were that they had retrieved one of the uncued
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elements (i.e., the element they were about to be tested on).
Specifically, we instructed them to make this judgment as if it were
a cued-recall trial (i.e., “How confident are you that you could tell
the experimenter the person, when cued with the location?” as
opposed to “How confident are you about getting the subsequent
cued-recognition judgment correct?”).
Based on participants’ average subjective confidence for an
event across the six retrieval trials for that event, we performed a
median split into high confidence and low confidence events.
Therefore, 18 events (with six cued-recognition trials per event)
were labeled as low confidence and 18 events as high confidence.
We designed this analysis to assess across-event differences in
dependency based on overall confidence in retrieval trials relating
to that event.
Method
Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2 with the following
exceptions:
Participants. Twenty-three participants (11 men) gave in-
formed consent to participate in Experiment 3. The mean age
across participants was 24.4 years (SD  5.1). By self-report, all
participants were right-handed.
Procedure. On a given test trial, a single cue was presented in
the middle of the screen for 3 s. Participants were instructed to
attempt to retrieve silently all information related to the event
during this time (i.e., the two noncued items). They were then
asked to judge how confident they were that they had correctly
retrieved one of the noncued items (e.g., if cued by location, they
were required to judge their confidence in retrieving the person).
They responded with a key press on a scale of 1–4, with a further
option below 1 of “no,” meaning they completely failed to retrieve
the item. They were given 5 s to make this judgment. Subsequent
to responding, participants carried out the same six-alternative
forced-choice and confidence judgments as in Experiment 2, with
the only difference being they were given 8 s to make the six-
alternative judgment rather than 5 s.
Results
Cued-recognition performance. As in Experiment 2, perfor-
mance was well above chance, with performance across cue type
and retrieval type at 71% (see Table 2). This higher performance
relative to Experiment 2 (58%) is likely a result of the 3-s cue-only
period where subjects were instructed to retrieve the entire epi-
sode. A three-way ANOVA across retrieval type failed to reveal a
main effect, F(1.8, 40.7)  .40, p  .66, p2  .02. No significant
effect was seen across cue type, F(1.8, 38.9) 2.66, p .09, P2 
.11. Accuracy increased according to both prememory judgment
confidence, F(3.1, 56.0)  27.19, p  .001, p2  .60 (lowest–
highest: 30.9%–91.2%), and postmemory judgment confidence,
F(3.1, 56.1) 27.26, p .001, p2 .60 (lowest–highest: 30.8%–
91.1%).
Performance for high versus low confidence events.
Cued-recognition performance for low versus high confidence
events are shown in Table 2. A 2 3 (confidence [high vs. low]
retrieval type [location vs. person vs. object]) ANOVA revealed a
main effect of confidence, F(1, 22)  45.74, p  .001, p2  .68,
with higher accuracy for high- than low-confidence events. The
main effect of retrieval type and the interaction failed to reach
significance, Fs .27, ps .75. A 2 3 ANOVA across cue type
also revealed a main effect of confidence, F(1, 22)  46.15, p 
.001, p2  .68, with greater performance for high- than low-
confidence events. The main effect of cue type and the interaction
failed to reach significance, Fs  2.38, ps  .11. Memory perfor-
mance was therefore higher for high-confidence than low-
confidence events.
Dependency analysis. Prior to performing a median split of
the events based on confidence, we collapsed across all events as
in Experiments 1–2 (see Figure 1 and Table 3). A 2  3 (Analysis
Type  Item Type) ANOVA on dependency of the observed data
revealed main effects of analysis type, F(1, 22) 28.70, p .001,
p2  .57, and item type, F(1.8, 38.8)  4.72, p  .05, p2  .18,
but no interaction, F(1.6, 35.9)  2.00, p  .16, p2  .08. The
main effect of analysis type showed greater dependency for the
ABAC than BACA analysis and the main effect of item type showed
least dependency for objects (see Table 3). Note that these effects
were not seen in Experiment 2 (though a trend for an effect of
analysis type was present), suggesting they are not replicable
across experiments. We therefore collapsed across these factors for
comparison between the data and the independent model.
Dependency (D) for the data and independent model is shown in
Figure 1. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the data showed greater
dependency than the independent model, t(22)  4.98, p  .001,
d  1.04. This difference in dependency (data  independent
model: 0.04) was similar in magnitude to the difference in depen-
dency seen in Experiment 2 (0.05), t(36)  0.83, p  .41, d 
0.30, and significantly less than the difference seen in Experiment
1 (.20), t(34)  11.83, p  .001, d  3.97. Experiment 3 therefore
replicated the decrease in dependency seen for cued-recognition
relative to cued-recall tasks. Note that this occurs despite all three
experiments having identical encoding instructions.
As in Experiment 2, we assessed dependency across Retrieval
Trials 1–2, 3–4, and 5–6. Accuracy (Pairs 1–3: 0.69, 0.71, 0.74),
F(1.9, 41.6) 3.78, p .05, p2 .15, and dependency (Pairs 1–3:
0.72, 0.77, 0.79), F(2.0, 40.1) 6.94, p .01, p2 .24, increased
across retrieval pairs. Analysis of the difference between the data
and the independent model (Pairs 1–3: 0.05, 0.06, 0.04) failed to
reveal a significant effect, F(1.8, 30.3)  .92, p  .40, p2  .04.
Therefore no difference in dependency was seen across retrieval
trials once increases in overall accuracy were taken into account.
Dependency for high versus low confidence events.
Splitting the events by prememory judgment confidence (average
confidence across all six cued-recognition trials for each event;
see Table 3 and Figure 1), we performed a 2  3  2 (Analysis
Type  Item Type  Confidence) ANOVA on dependency of the
observed data. This analysis showed there was a main effect of
confidence, F(1, 22)  40.25, p  .001, p2  .65, revealing
greater dependency for high- than for low-confidence events (as
expected given the higher accuracy for high-confidence events).
Further main effects of analysis type, F(1, 22)  28.66, p  .001,
p2  .57, and item type, F(1.8, 38.7)  4.48, p  .05, p2  .17,
were also present (see earlier nonsplit analyses). Finally, interac-
tions were seen between confidence and analysis type, F(1, 22) 
4.42, p  .05, p2  .17, and confidence and item type, F(2.0,
44.0)  4.48, p  .05, p2  .17 (reflecting significant effects of
analysis type and item type for low-confidence, Fs  9.77, ps 
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.001, but not high-confidence, Fs  1.8, ps  .19, events; see
Table 3).
Collapsing across analysis type and item type, we compared
low- and high-confidence events with the independent model.
Although high-confidence events showed greater dependency than
the independent model, t(22)  2.74, p  .05, d  0.60, no
difference was seen for low-confidence events, t(22)  0.85, p 
.40, d  0.16; the interaction term, however, failed to reach
significance, F(1, 22)  2.04, p  .17, P2  .09. These data
suggest the level of dependency was therefore modulated by
within-event confidence, with low confidence being associated
with levels of dependency equivalent to the independent model.
Modeling Episodic Dependency
The Dependent Model
Across Experiments 1–3, we have provided evidence for epi-
sodic dependency. We consistently saw greater dependency than
that predicted by the independent model. Indeed, the only situation
where the independent model was able to account for the data was
for low-confidence events in Experiment 3. In order to account for
this dependency, we developed a dependent model, where within-
event performance was modulated by an episodic factor (Ei) that
varies across events. This factor captures the extent to which the
probability of correctly retrieving all the elements making up an
event varies from the average probability across all events.
When cued with A, this is estimated as the factor by which
performance for that event (when cued with B or C) differs
from the average performance across all events (when cued
with B or C):
Ei TiBA TiBC TiCA TiCB ⁄ PBA PBC PCA PCB,
(1)
where for Event i, TiBA  1 if the participant correctly retrieves A
when cued by B, otherwise, TiBA  0; that is, TiBA relates to the
specific retrieval trial (T) for B when cued by A for Event i. Note
that the episodic factor, for retrievals cued by A, does not include
data from retrievals cued by A (i.e., TiAB, TiAC, PAB, PAC). As such,
it is estimated using data from independent retrieval attempts. It
should therefore capture variations in performance that have con-
sistent effects across the multiple retrieval attempts concerning a
given event. The probability of correctly retrieving a single item
from a specific Event i is weighted by the episodic factor for that
event. Thus, for the dependent model, for Event i, when cued by A,
the probability of (a) correctly retrieving both B and C is equal to
(Ei)2PABPAC; (b) correctly retrieving B but not C is equal to
EiPAB(1  EiPAC); (c) correctly retrieving C but not B is equal
to (1  EiPAB)EiPAC, and (d) incorrectly retrieving B and C is
equal to (1  EiPAB)(1  EiPAC). Table 1 presents the contin-
gency table for the dependent model across all N episodes. The
independent model previously outlined corresponds to setting Ei
1 across all events.
For Experiment 1, we saw no significant difference between the
data and the dependent model, t(12)  1.20, p  .25, d  0.30
(Figure 2). Thus, our dependent model seems to fully capture the
level of dependency seen in cued recall. The dependent model
overpredicted the level of dependency in Experiment 2, t(14) 
5.20, p  .001, d  1.41, and Experiment 3, t(22)  4.63, p 
.001, d  0.97 (when collapsed across high- and low-confidence
events). The level of dependency during cued recognition was
therefore greater than the independent model but less than the
dependent model. These results serve to underlie how dependence
differs as a function of retrieval task, with less dependency during
cued recognition than cued recall.
Finally, whereas the dependent model overpredicted the level of
dependency for low-confidence events in Experiment 3, t(22) 
5.18, p  .001, d  1.07, no difference was seen between the data
and the dependent model for high-confidence events, t(22) 1.69,
p  .11, d  0.30. High-confidence events during cued recogni-
tion therefore appeared to show episodic dependency similar to
that seen during cued recall (i.e., similar to the dependent model in
Figure 2. Mean dependency (D) for the observed data, the dependent model and the dependent model with
guessing, collapsed across the ABAC and BACA analyses and item type, for (A) Experiments 1–3 and (B) low
and high confidence events for Experiment 3. Note that the dependent model with guessing is equivalent to the
dependent model in Experiment 1 (hence, not shown), given that participants were explicitly instructed to answer
“don’t know” instead of guessing. Therefore, the probability of participants answering correctly when they did
not know was zero (i.e., PG/c  0). Error bars represent 	1 standard error. Exp.  experiment; ns 
nonsignificant.  p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
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both cases), whereas low-confidence events show reduced depen-
dency (i.e., similar to the independent model). Our dependent
model therefore does a good job in characterizing the level of
dependence during cued recall and cued recognition for events
where confidence is high. However, it consistently overpredicted
the level of dependence for cued recognition (when not split by
confidence and for low-confidence events).
One possible issue with our episodic factor is that although it
does not include data from the retrieval trials actually being
predicted (see Equation 1), it does include data from retrieval trials
testing the same association (but in reverse). For example, if we
are predicting retrieval performance for Element B when cued by
A, we included performance for the retrieval trial testing A when
cued by B. If the associative strength between these elements is
symmetrical (i.e., the strength of the A–to–B association is
related to the strength of the B–to–A connection; see Kahana,
2002), this might increase our ability to predict the level of
dependency in our dependent model. To address this issue, we
calculated Ei based on the retrieval trials for the association that
was not of interest. For example, if we were interested in
assessing the dependency between retrieval of Elements B and
C when cued by A, we calculated Ei based on performance of
the B–C association: Ei  (CiBC  CiCB)/(PBC  PCB). We
compared this revised model with one where we calculated Ei
based on performance for the retrieval of trials for the associ-
ation of interest (but tested in reverse). In the previous example,
this would be the B–to–A association and the C–to–A associ-
ation: Ei  (CiBA  CiCA)/(PBA  PCA).
These revised models predicted equivalent dependency to each
other for Experiment 1, t(12)  .001, p  .99, d  0.05; Exper-
iment 2, t(14)  1.36, p  .20, d  0.39; and Experiment 3,
t(22)  1.48, p  .15, d  0.15. Therefore, building dependent
models based on performance for the reverse of the associations of
interest does not appear to predict the level of dependency more
accurately than dependent models based on performance for the
untested association. Thus, the inclusion of retrieval trials for the
reverse of the associations of interest in the Dependent Model
played no specific role in its ability to correctly predict the level of
dependency in the data.
The Dependent Model With Guessing
Across Experiments 1–3, we saw dependency differ as a func-
tion of retrieval task and event-specific retrieval confidence. Nei-
ther the independent model nor the dependent model was able to
fully account for the pattern of dependency seen across experi-
ments. What causes these differences in dependency? One possi-
bility is that participants were more likely to guess in the forced-
choice cued-recognition tests in Experiments 2–3 than during the
cued-recall test in Experiment 1 (in which they were instructed to
say “don’t know” rather than guess). Equally, participants may
guess more for events associated with low versus high confidence.
Guessing could render the dependent model inaccurate because
some of the proportion of correct responses (which the dependent
model assumes to be modulated by the episodic factor Ei) actually
arises from lucky guesses rather than from any memory process
that would be modulated by an event-specific factor.
In Experiment 1, of the 43% of trials that were not correctly
answered, 31% were “don’t know” responses and 12% were in-
correct responses, and the chance of guessing correctly was low
(1/24; i.e., if all the incorrect responses were guesses). We would
therefore expect a maximum of 0.5% of responses in Experiment
1 to be lucky correct guesses. By contrast, in six-way forced-
choice decisions (i.e., Experiment 2), the 42% of incorrect re-
sponses could all be guesses, which would imply around 8% of
responses could be lucky correct guesses.
To take account of the proportion of guessed responses, we
developed the dependent model with guessing. If guessing is
occurring, the probability of retrieving B when cued by A (PAB) is
the sum of the probability of “real” retrieval (PrAB) when not
guessing (1 PG) and the probability of guessing correctly (1/c in
a c-way forced choice) when “real” retrieval fails (PG). In c–way
forced choice, we have:
PAB (1 PG)PrAB PG ⁄ c. (2)
Now the dependent model is obtained by replacing PrAB by EiPrAB,
where Ei is calculated as before (Equation 1), and forming the
contingency table from the adjusted estimate of PAB:
(1 PG)EiPrAB PG/cEiPABPG/c) PG/c. (3)
This gives the dependent model with guessing in Table 1, which
reverts to the dependent model for PG  0, and reverts to the
independent model for Ei  1. Note that the independent model is
unaffected by the proportion of guessed trials (PG) and that taking
account of guessing effectively reduces the influence of factor Ei
by removing guesses from the proportion of correct responses that
it multiplies (see Equation 3).
Because we found similar performance across cue type and
retrieval type, we assumed a single proportion of guessed trials
(PG) for each subject, irrespective of cue type and retrieval type.
The level of guessing is unknown but is constrained by the fact that
the proportion of errors caused by guessing, (c  1)PG/c, is no
greater than the overall proportion of errors, giving:
PG [1 PAB PBA PBC PBC PAC PCA ⁄ 6]
c ⁄ c 1. (4)
The dependent model with guessing, assuming that all errors
reflect guessing (i.e., assuming equality in Equation 4), provides a
good match to the level of dependency in Experiments 2 and 3 (see
Figure 2). Though we saw significantly less dependency for the
data than the dependent model with guessing for Experiment 2,
t(14)  2.46, p  .05, d  0.62, and Experiment 3, t(22)  3.01,
p  .01, d  0.67, the effect sizes were small relative to those of
the dependent model (Experiment 2, d  1.41; Experiment 3, d 
0.97) and the independent model (Experiment 2, d  0.91; Exper-
iment 3, d 1.05). Finally, we saw no difference between the data
and the dependent model with guessing for high-confidence
events, t(22) 0.47, p .65, d 0.17, but a significant difference
was seen for low-confidence events, t(22)  4.22, p  .001, d 
0.86 (though again the effect size was small relative to the depen-
dent model, d  1.07).
The dependent model with guessing therefore provides a good
fit to the data across Experiments 2 and 3, suggesting the decrease
in dependency during cued recognition compared with cued recall
was at least partly driven by differences in the level of guessing
between retrieval tasks (with increases in guessing decreasing
1378 HORNER AND BURGESS
dependency). Although the dependent model with guessing cannot
fully accommodate all the results of Experiment 3, it appears to
explain a large proportion of variance in both Experiments 2 and
3 (mean 91.4% of between-subjects variance across Experiments
2–3, relative to 84.9% for the independent model and 89.0% for
the dependent model). Therefore, we have provided evidence that
the retrieval of events is modulated by a within-event episodic
factor that varies across events (once changes in the level of
guessing across retrieval task and confidence are taken into ac-
count).
General Discussion
Long-standing neuroscientific and psychological theories of
memory predict that the multimodal elements of an episodic event
are bound together within the hippocampus. We have introduced a
novel method to assess this theorized binding. By building inde-
pendent and dependent models, based on a participant’s individual
behavior, we were able to assess episodic dependency while con-
trolling for overall memory performance. Across three experi-
ments, we were consistently able to reject the independent model,
demonstrating interdependence in the ability to retrieve the differ-
ent elements comprising the same event. This episodic dependency
was seen both within retrieval trials requiring recall of two ele-
ments (Experiment 1) and across multiple retrieval trials concern-
ing individual elements from the same event (all experiments). The
dependency seen across multiple retrieval trials concerning ele-
ments from the same event indicates that retrieval of an event
reflects a common factor that varies across events rather than
across retrieval trials.
Though we consistently found evidence for episodic depen-
dency, the degree of dependency was shown to vary as a function
of retrieval task and the average subjective confidence of covert
recall prior to (multiple) retrievals of a given event. This indicates
that the nature of the retrieval task, as well as an individual’s
subjective confidence concerning an event, is relevant for our
analyses. These differences appeared to be partially driven by
differences in the level of guessing across retrieval task and
confidence. We discuss the functional implications of these find-
ings in the following text.
The Cause of Within-Event Dependency
We observed greater dependence between the retrieval of dif-
ferent elements of the same event than predicted by the average
performance level across all retrieval trials (i.e., more dependence
than the independent model). This increased dependence was
observed across multiple retrieval trials (three trials in Experiment
1; six trials in Experiments 2–3). Thus, the variation in perfor-
mance across all retrieval trials in an experiment tended to reflect
variation between events—performance on retrieving the individ-
ual elements composing a given event is similar (i.e., the ability to
retrieve one element tends to be predicted by the average ability to
retrieve the other elements in the same event: factor Ei in the
dependent model). Confirming this, analysis of the raw response
data (i.e., correct or incorrect on each trial) revealed that between-
event variation accounted for 27% of the total variance.
What potential mechanisms might explain these results? For
simplicity, we suppose that an event is encoded as pairwise asso-
ciations among its constituent elements. Then one model of re-
trieval would be that activation of the cue item causes reactivation
of the retrieved item via the corresponding association, with per-
formance reflecting associative strength. In this model, a between-
events modulation of encoding strength, perhaps due to variations
in general attention or arousal, would produce dependence be-
tween the retrieval of the elements of the same event, because they
reflect the same modulatory factor (factor Ei in the dependent
model).
In an alternative model, the cued retrieval of one element of an
event might reflect a process of pattern completion in which all
elements are re-activated via all of the within-event associations.
In this case, retrieval of each element of an event would reflect the
average strength of all pairwise associations within that event, thus
creating an interdependence that would also be modeled by the
factor Ei in the dependent model, even though the strengths of the
association themselves were independent.
The current data do not distinguish between the two alternative
models outlined above. Further experiments will be necessary. For
example, presenting elements of an event in a pairwise manner
across encoding trials (in an analagous manner to Zeithamova,
Dominick, & Preston, 2012) would presumably not allow for a
common encoding factor (such as attention) to mediate the asso-
ciative strength between all within-even elements. The presence of
episodic dependency under these encoding conditions would there-
fore favor the pattern completion rather than the common associa-
tive strength account. Alternatively, increasing the number of
elements within each event should increase reaction times during
cued retrieval of a single element according to the pattern-
completion explanation, but not under the common modulation of
associative strength explanation.
Retrieval-Related Factors Affecting Within-Event
Dependency, and Guessing
Although we consistently rejected the independent model across
three experiments, we also found that the level of within-event
dependency varied significantly with retrieval task. Whereas in
Experiment 1 (using a cued-recall task) showed high levels of
dependency, Experiment 2 (using a cued-recognition task) showed
lower levels of dependency. How does the retrieval task modulate
dependency? We introduced a dependent model with guessing,
given that participants may have relied more heavily on guessing
during cued recognition than cued recall and that the episodic
factor (Ei) in the dependent model should not be applied to the
proportion of correct responses that arise from guessing (see
Equations 2 and 3). Once we incorporated guessing into the
dependent model, we were able to explain a large proportion of
the variance of Experiment 2. These results suggest that cued
recognition may rely on retrieval mechanisms similar to cued
recall and show similar levels of dependence, once the increased
guessing in cued recognition is taken into account. Despite this, the
dependent model with guessing was not fully able to explain the
results of Experiments 2 and 3. If future experiments reveal a
consistent overprediction in dependency for cued recognition, it
may relate to an underlying difference with cued recall, such as the
extent to which pattern completion is required at retrieval.
To extend these results, in Experiment 3, we investigated
whether differences in dependency could be seen between events
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(within-subject) according to whether they were rated with low or
high subjective confidence following covert recall (averaged over
the retrieval trials concerning that event). We showed greater
dependency for high- than for low-confidence events. Low-
confidence events were presumably associated with greater levels
of guessing and therefore less dependency. Again, incorporating
guessing into our dependent model provided a better fit to the data
than the dependent model. This result suggests that the main
difference between high- and low-confidence events is the level of
guessing when answering questions concerning that event (i.e.,
across multiple retrieval trials), with similar levels of dependency
seen once this is taken into account.
Despite this, dependency for low-confidence events showed less
dependence than the dependent model with guessing. If this deficit
in dependence is seen consistently over future experiments, it is
possible that low-confidence events are encoded in a less holistic
way than high-confidence events. Perhaps some pairwise associ-
ations within low-confidence events are so weak as to fail to
benefit from between-event modulation at encoding or to fail to
contribute to pattern completion at retrieval.
Finally, we note that the 3-s covert recall period between pre-
sentation of the cue and the six-alternative response options in
Experiment 3 improved memory performance relative to Experi-
ment 2. Thus, accuracy improves when participants are encour-
aged to covertly recall the entire event prior to a cued-recognition
judgment. This improvement in performance was not, however,
associated with increased dependency. Indeed, the dependent
model with guessing provided a good fit to both Experiments 2 and
3. Participants were able to use the 3-s cue-only period of Exper-
iment 3 to increase the probability of successfully retrieving the
correct event element, but this procedure, when successful, appears
to have simply increased confidence and performance and reduced
guessing without otherwise changing the amount of within-event
dependence.
Implications for Models of Hippocampal
Episodic Binding
The cued recall and cued recognition tasks used here are exam-
ples of the episodic, associative, declarative, or relational memory
thought to depend on the hippocampus (Cohen & Eichenbaum,
1993; Kinsbourne & Wood, 1975; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Sco-
ville & Milner, 1957; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991), and a similar
object–person–place memory task was previously shown to be
impaired by hippocampal damage (Spiers, Burgess, Hartley, et al.,
2001; Spiers, Burgess, Maguire, et al., 2001). Although nonhip-
pocampal medial temporal lobe regions, such as the perirhinal
cortex, have been implicated in unimodal associative processes
(Mayes et al., 2004, 2007) or complex conjunctive representations
of objects (Barense, Gaffan, & Graham, 2007; Bussey & Saksida,
2007), such regions are not thought to support associations be-
tween multimodal representations. Indeed, in a recent study,
Horner et al. (2012) found evidence for a double dissociation
between these regions, with nonhippocampal medial temporal lobe
regions selectively contributing to recognition memory for single
items (words) and the hippocampus selectively contributing to the
successful retrieval of (word–scene) pairwise associations.
The imagery task and memoranda used here were designed to
require cross-modal binding, given that the hippocampus is
thought to act as a convergence zone, binding multimodal infor-
mation represented in distinct neocortical regions into event en-
grams (Damasio, 1989; Marr, 1971). In particular, the relatively
high proportion of recurrent collaterals in region CA3 of the
hippocampus has been associated with the ability to bind such
multimodal information, via the collateral effect (Marr, 1971) or
pattern completion (Gardner-Medwin, 1976; Hopfield, 1982; Mc-
Clelland et al., 1995; Treves & Rolls, 1992). Thus, both the
anatomical situation of the hippocampus, at the top of a hierarchy
of inputs from neocortical regions, and the architecture of CA3
provide the ideal platform for rapidly binding elements of an event
into a coherent representation.
We analyzed our results in terms of a model of memory in
which each event is encoded by pairwise associations between its
constituent elements. This is consistent with the anatomy (see
earlier discussion) and with the observation that single neurons
within the hippocampus fire in response to specific environmental
locations in both rodents (O’Keefe & Dostrovsky, 1971) and
humans (Ekstrom et al., 2003), and in response to specific famous
people in humans (Quiroga, Reddy, Kreiman, Koch, & Fried,
2005). We presume neurons in the hippocampus representing
distinct elements initially increase their associative strength due to
the co-occurrence of two elements. Over time, however, such cells
may come to activate equally for both elements, effectively coding
a combined two-element representation (Miyashita, 1993; Scha-
piro, Kustner, & Turk-Browne, 2012).
We interpreted the dependence we observed between retrieval
of different elements of the same event in terms of two types of
model. Under one type of model, the strength of pairwise associ-
ations relating to the same event is uniformly affected by an
encoding factor that varies between events. At retrieval, the prob-
ability of retrieving different elements from the same event is
related because the strengths of the corresponding associations are
all modulated by the same factor (Ei in Equation 1). Thus, if
attention is high for the encoding of a specific event, stronger
pairwise associations might be formed, possibly via increased
firing rates and thus increased long-term potentiation, as hypoth-
esized for place cell firing (e.g., Fenton et al., 2010; Kentros,
Agnihotri, Streater, Hawkins, & Kandel, 2004).
Under the alternative type of model, all cued-retrieval trials rely on
a process of pattern completion in which activation from neurons
representing the cue element reactivates neurons representing all of
the other elements via all of the pairwise associations between them.
Thus, all within-event pairwise associations contribute to the final
retrieval state, regardless of the element that is actually required to be
retrieved, and the ability to retrieve all elements from the event are
related to mean performance by the same overall factor (again, Ei in
Equation 1). This model is consistent with the collateral effect (Marr,
1971) or pattern-completion effect simulated in many models of the
hippocampus as an associative memory network (Gardner-Medwin,
1976; Hopfield, 1982; McClelland et al., 1995; Treves & Rolls,
1992). Direct evidence for pattern completion in the hippocampus can
be seen in the way that place cell firing evolves when a rat is placed
in an environment intermediate to two distinct, familiar environments
(Wills, Lever, Cacucci, Burgess, & O’Keefe, 2005) or in the way that
place cell firing is robust to removal of subsets of environmental cues
unless NMDA receptors in CA3 are knocked out (Nakazawa et al.,
2002). Future experiments will be required to distinguish between
these two types of models, as discussed earlier.
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Finally, the two types of abstract model we outlined are consis-
tent with several different implementations. In addition to the
direct implementation of encoding factors or pattern completion at
retrieval discussed previously, our evidence for episodic depen-
dency accords with context models of episodic memory, whereby
items (elements) seen at encoding are bound to a time-varying
representation of context (Estes, 1955; Howard & Kahana, 2002).
In particular, the temporal context model (Howard & Kahana,
2002; Polyn & Kahana, 2008) would predict that the 3 elements
present at encoding of a single event would be bound to a contex-
tual representation (and contribute to that representation). At re-
trieval the presentation of a single element results in the retrieval
of the associated context, including information relating to the two
noncued elements. As such, retrieval of the contextual represen-
tation itself could introduce shared variance at encoding and could
also support pattern completion at retrieval.
Potential Methodological Issues
Our dependency analyses necessarily required assessing memory
for a single event across multiple retrieval trials. These multiple
retrieval trials might have served to increase the associative strength
within-event, increasing the likelihood of seeing episodic dependency.
However, we could find no evidence for such a mechanism; depen-
dency did not increase across multiple retrieval trials once we had
controlled for increases in accuracy. Our main conclusions would
have held regardless of whether we analyzed the first or last retrieval
trial.
Despite increases in accuracy, Experiments 1 and 2 (but not 3)
showed decreases in dependency across retrieval trials. One possible
explanation for such a decrease in dependency (at least in Experiment
2) would be retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson et al., 1994). Here
the repeated selective retrieval of a single within-event element (e.g.,
B when cued by A) leads to the inhibition of the other nontested
element (e.g., C). Such an inhibitory process could increase the
difference in strength between within-event associations, resulting in
decreased dependency. We did not see such a decrease in Experiment
3, however, suggesting that if such a process were present, it is not
reliable within the present experimental paradigm.
A further potential explanation for dependency for two elements
(e.g., person and object) when cued by a single element (e.g., location)
would be a “good cue” effect. If some locations acted as a better cue
than others, then the probability of retrieving the other two within-
event elements would be increased for that location and decreased for
other locations, resulting in dependency. However, we also showed
dependency in our analysis of retrieval of a single element (e.g.,
location) when cued by the other two elements (e.g., person and
object) across separate retrieval trials. Dependency in this analysis
could not have resulted from a single good cue effect (though we note
that dependency was reduced for this analysis in Experiment 3). In
addition, there were no systematic differences in dependence across
the different cue types and retrieval types, ruling out that dependence
reflects variations in the memorability of a specific type of element.
Finally, we constructed three separate models (the independent,
dependent and dependent model with guessing) in an attempt to
predict the level of dependency seen in the data across three experi-
ments. These models had no “free parameters” that were allowed to
vary in order to minimize the difference between the data and the
model. For example, the episodic factor Ei was calculated on the basis
of the ratio of performance for a single event relative to performance
across all events. There is no specific reason why inclusion of Ei
would allow for a better model fit than if Ei were set to 1 (as in the
independent model). Indeed, we saw situations, such as for low-
confidence events in Experiment 3, where the independent model fit
the data better than the dependent model.
Summary
We have presented three experiments that provide consistent evi-
dence for episodic dependency. This evidence supports the assump-
tion, made by many models of the hippocampus and episodic mem-
ory, that the multimodal information that forms an event is bound
within a coherent associative structure or event engram, such that the
ability to retrieve different elements of the same event is related.
These results are readily explicable by means of a dependent model
(including guessing) in which a single episodic factor, that varies
across events, uniformly affects the retrieval of the various elements
comprising the same event. This factor might reflect a common (e.g.,
attentional) modulation of the strength of encoding of within-event
associations or a process of pattern completion by which all within-
event associations contribute to the cued retrieval of each element.
Both potential mechanisms are consistent with several aspects of the
neurophysiology of the hippocampus. The specific mechanism re-
sponsible for episodic dependency will require further experiments to
identify. The procedure provided here will allow quantitative analysis
of this within-event dependency, which is an important feature of
episodic memory and one that many models assume to be the char-
acteristic contribution of the hippocampus.
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Full List of 36 Locations, People, and Objects Used in Experiments 2 and 3
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Locations People Objects
Train station George Clooney Football
Supermarket Britney Spears Wallet
Cinema Prince William Hammer
Restaurant Beyonce Light bulb
Pub Justin Timberlake Battery
Office Hilary Clinton Skateboard
Car park David Cameron Necklace
Gym Angelina Jolie Violin
Bowling alley George Bush Pencil case
Lift Tony Blair Handbag
Tree house Barack Obama Pram
Living room David Beckham Trophy
Hospital Jennifer Lopez Spade
Church Robert De Niro Bike
Swimming pool Mick Jagger Calculator
Cruise ship Gordon Brown Carrot
Coffee shop Wayne Rooney Camera
Zoo Stephen Hawking Book
Nightclub Sean Connery Trumpet
Park Johnny Depp Basket
School yard Kylie Minogue Umbrella
Police station Margaret Thatcher Mug
Beach Lady Gaga Television
Stadium Kate Middleton Cricket bat
Ski lift Bill Gates Magnet
Kitchen Tom Cruise Mirror
Bedroom Madonna Whisk
Basement Clint Eastwood Paintbrush
Patio Paul McCartney Jug
Airport Harrison Ford Screwdriver
Motorway Oprah Winfrey Chainsaw
River John Travolta Sewing machine
Cornfield Julia Roberts Sleeping bag
Bank Pamela Anderson Toothbrush
Hair salon Meryl Streep Dice
Casino Angela Merkel Binoculars
Note. In Experiment 1, a subset of 24 was used.
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